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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Martin H. Redish is on the warpath. Like General Sherman 
marching toward Atlanta (or Justin Tuck marching toward Tom Brady), 
Professor Redish, together with Matthew Arnould,
1
 lays waste to every 
constitutional theory that he encounters. Originalism, with its “belief that 
constitutional interpretation should be characterized exclusively by an 
effort to determine the Constitution’s meaning by means of some form of 
historical inquiry,”2 generates “an often contrived and opaque veil of 
historical inquiry”3 that provides “an ideal smokescreen behind which 
judges may pursue their personal[,] moral, political[,] or economic goals 
with relative impunity.”4 Nontextual theories, for their part, “permit[] 
selective manipulation of constitutional doctrine in order to advance 
narrow political goals”5 and allow judges “to insert their own values in 
                                                                                                                     
  Philip S. Beck Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.  I am grateful to the 
Michaels Faculty Research Fund for support. 
 1. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, 
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1485 (2012). Having published four coauthored articles with students at Northwestern University 
School of Law during my time there (and one more during my time at Boston University School of 
Law), I understand the indispensable role that the students play in the generation of such works. I 
am therefore reluctant to shorten “Professor Redish and Mr. Arnould” to “Professor Redish.” 
Nonetheless, I will do so in this Article, at least in textual references, in order to promote editorial 
economy (and afford Mr. Arnould a measure of plausible deniability, should he ever seek it). 
 2. Id. at 1487. 
 3. Id. at 1489. 
 4. Id. at 1522. 
 5. Id. at 1490. 
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place of democratically sanctioned choices.”6 Modern constitutional 
theory, proclaims Professor Redish, is therefore caught between the Scylla 
of “an often fruitless and strategically manipulative straightjacket of 
originalism’s supposedly rigid historical inquiry on the one hand”7 and the 
Charybdis of “the linguistic chaos and epistemological arrogance of 
nontextualist inquiry, on the other.”8 As an alternative, Professor Redish 
proposes a methodology that uses the contemporary linguistic meaning of 
constitutional provisions to set outer boundaries for adjudication, 
supplemented by “use of principled normative inquiry, informed and 
controlled by a transparent, candid explication of a constitutional 
provision’s underlying meaning based on the intellectual normative 
framework chosen to be employed by the jurist.”9 
I am delighted and honored that I was selected by Professor Redish and 
the Florida Law Review to represent fruitless and strategic manipulation in 
this exchange. (Dean Erwin Chemerinsky is presumably the standard-
bearer for linguistic chaos and epistemological arrogance.) Unfortunately 
for the spirit of the exchange, I actually think that much of Professor 
Redish’s assessment of originalism is correct. To be sure, though, we part 
company on some important matters. I believe (1) that Professor Redish is 
wrong to reason from differences in methodology among originalists
10
 to 
the impossibility of a principled and coherent approach within a single 
originalist theory; (2) that his very strong claims about the dangers of 
manipulation of various versions of originalist theory
11
 need more 
systematic empirical support, rather than scattered examples; and (3) that 
he is sometimes too quick to attribute bad motives to actions that might 
more easily be explained by lack of careful analysis. But Professor Redish 
is on generally solid ground in thinking that (1) history done by legal 
scholars or judges is likely to be bad history;
12
 (2) it is a mistake to think 
that reliance on history, even if done well, will necessarily produce 
interpretative results that are certain in all, or even most, significant 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Id. at 1522. 
 7. Id. at 1492. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See id. at 1501–02. 
 11. See id. at 1594 (“[T]he originalist model inevitably lends itself to precisely the type of 
strategic political manipulation that it claims to be designed to avoid.”) (emphasis added). 
 12. See id. at 1500–02, 1509; Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal 
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 77–78 (2006). This is not to say that history done by 
professional historians is necessarily going to be all peachy—as a noteworthy modern episode 
involving probate records and gun ownership amply demonstrates. See generally Stanley N. Katz, 
Hanna H. Gray & Laurel Thatcher, Report of the Investigative Committee in the Matter of Professor 
Michael Bellesiles (July 10, 2002), http://www.emory.edu/news/Releases/Final_Report.pdf. But the 
problems with even professional historiography simply strengthen Professor Redish’s critique of 
interpretative methodologies that rely heavily on historical analysis. 
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cases;
13
 (3) interpretative reliance upon the concrete intentions (whether 
they are labeled “intentions” or “understandings”) of historically real 
persons presents grave practical and conceptual problems;
14
 and (4) 
employing temporally changing, judge-made “constructions” to fill in 
interpretative gaps left by historical uncertainty is, at best, oddly described 
as a form of “originalism.”15 That is a lot about which to be right. In fact, 
once one has done away with history, certainty, actual intentions, and 
construction, what is left of originalism? 
For at least some forms of originalism, the answer is “not very much.” 
If the goal of interpretation really is to identify the historically real mental 
states of some group of persons—whether the “Framers,” the “ratifiers,” or 
the “general public” (however one chooses to define those terms)—then, at 
the very least, judges, lawyers, and law professors are likely not the people 
best suited to interpret. Rather, it would seem that historians, linguists, 
psychologists, and semioticians are better qualified for the job.
16
 Even 
more fundamentally, and aside from the practical and conceptual problems 
involved in identifying the concrete intentions or understandings behind a 
centuries-old, jointly authored document, the Constitution itself seems to 
prescribe interpretation by reference to the intentions of a fictitious, rather 
than real, person: the imaginary “We the People” by whom the 
Constitution purports to be “ordain[ed] and establish[ed].”17 Grounding 
constitutional meaning in historically real intentions, including the 
intentions or understandings of the ratifiers, or some even broader grouping 
of the general public, is indeed rife with “archeological and conceptual 
shortcomings.”18 
Nor is it clear that any particular version of originalism, including one 
(such as mine) that avoids the principal epistemological problems of 
reliance on history,
19
 is necessarily going to yield more certain and 
predictable results than other theories. After all, perhaps the most 
predictable votes on the United States Supreme Court in recent memory 
were those of Chief Justices Warren Burger and William Rehnquist and 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1502–03. 
 14. See id. at 1595; Lawson & Seidman, supra note 12, at 61–67 (discussing problems with 
attributing intentions to collectives). 
 15. See Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1511; Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 
B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1232–33 (2012). 
 16. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 12, at 50, 76–78. By the same token, legal scholars 
who advocate theories of interpretation that rely on moral theory or evolving social values also 
write themselves out of work. Philosophers, sociologists, and pollsters, just to name a few classes of 
professionals, are all more plausible “constitutional interpreter[s]” than judges, lawyers, and law 
professors under any such model. Id. at 76–77. 
 17. U.S. CONST. pmbl. For a modest defense of this claim, and a short discussion of how “We 
the People” relates to the historically real authors of the Constitution, see Lawson & Seidman, 
supra note 12, at 58–61. 
 18. Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1490. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
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Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, none of whom was 
either a sophisticated, or consistent, practitioner of originalism.
20
 An 
interpretative methodology that says, “decide cases in accordance with 
(pick one) the current political platform of the liberal wing of the 
Democratic Party or the current political platform of the conservative wing 
of the Republican Party” yields predictability and determinacy in 
abundance. A judge faithfully following this methodology would be 
severely constrained by a source of meaning external to the judge. If 
constraint and certainty are the goals, originalism is a relatively poor way 
to achieve it compared to numerous other methodologies. 
Finally, if one is seeking democratic legitimacy for constitutional 
review, one is unlikely to find it in adherence to a two-centuries-old 
document. Legitimacy, democratic or otherwise, is a moral concept and 
can only be found in moral theory. Perhaps the Constitution, interpreted in 
accordance with its original meaning, is morally better than any available 
alternative source of governance in some particular context of time and 
culture—but that is not something that can be determined by originalism 
(or any other interpretative theory), and the claim is hardly self-evident. It 
will not do to argue that the Constitution itself prescribes, even if only 
implicitly, a particular role for judicial review, because that only 
establishes what the Constitution means. It does not establish that real-
world judges should decide real-world cases in accordance with that 
meaning. 
Thus, judged by the standards of interpretative soundness, certainty, 
and democratic legitimacy, originalism as described by Professor Redish, 
definitely has problems. The remaining questions are whether he has 
described originalism accurately and whether his own “controlled 
activism” alternative is superior to originalism along any relevant 
dimensions. This Article will address those questions. 
Part I will identify which versions of originalism are and are not 
subject to the kinds of criticisms that Professor Redish levels. In particular, 
it will show that the form of originalism that is increasingly emerging 
among sophisticated adherents—a form in which meaning is determined by 
the hypothetical understandings of a fictitious reasonable observer, rather 
than those of any concrete historical figures—does not suffer from the 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See EARL M. MALTZ, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF WARREN BURGER, 1969–1986 29 (2000) 
(noting that Justice Rehnquist was frequently swayed by the politics of particular cases); Lee J. 
Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical 
Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 287–88 (2011) (explaining that “[o]riginalism’s modern 
incarnation arose as a critique of the Warren and Burger Courts” and their consistently liberal 
rulings); SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 504–05 (2010) 
(quoting Justice Brennan’s description of originalism as “little more than arrogance cloaked as 
humility”); THURGOOD MARSHALL: HIS SPEECHES, WRITINGS, ARGUMENTS, OPINIONS, AND 
REMINISCENCES 281 (Mark V. Tushnet ed., 2001) (describing Justice Marshall as a challenger of 
originalism). 
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interpretative pathologies that Professor Redish identifies. Furthermore, it 
will show that any interpretative theory—originalist or otherwise—can 
achieve adjudicative determinacy even in the face of interpretative 
uncertainty through appropriate allocations of burdens and standards of 
proof. A highly indeterminate interpretative theory can generate a highly 
determinate set of adjudicative outcomes—which presumably is the form 
of determinacy with which Professor Redish is most concerned. Finally, 
Part I will briefly suggest that a focus on democratic legitimacy—a focus 
shared by almost everyone engaged in constitutional theory, except me—is 
a distraction from the kinds of issues with which legal theory can sensibly 
concern itself. 
Part II will briefly engage Professor Redish’s “controlled activism” 
approach. Because it is primarily a theory of adjudication rather than a 
theory of interpretation, in the sense that the demands of the adjudicative 
theory drive the underlying interpretative theory rather than vice versa, any 
critique of the theory must be normative. I try to avoid normative theory in 
my professional work, and I will try to avoid it here. Accordingly, I will 
content myself with posing some questions that Professor Redish might 
want to consider in fleshing out his approach. 
Again, I am grateful to Professor Redish and the Florida Law Review 
for allowing me to participate in this forum. I miss many things about 
Northwestern University School of Law—and having Marty Redish as a 
colleague is one of the things I miss most. 
I.  PROJECT ORIGINALISM: INTERPRETERS OF THE RUNWAY
21
 
Why would anyone be a constitutional originalist? Presumably, one 
cannot answer that question without first asking, and answering, what 
being a “constitutional originalist” really means—a question that is not 
asked nearly often enough, especially by self-proclaimed constitutional 
originalists. 
Originalism can be a theory of interpretation, a theory of adjudication, 
or both. That is, originalism can be either a theory of ascertaining the 
meaning of a document—for example, the United States Constitution—or 
a theory of decision making in cases that at least nominally invoke that 
document. The relationship between the two kinds of originalism is 
contingent. One could perfectly well believe that originalism is the 
interpretatively correct way to understand the United States Constitution, 
but doubt whether decision makers (such as courts) should make real-
world decisions based on that understanding. Similarly, one might believe 
that originalism is inferior to some other methodology as a tool for 
ascertaining constitutional meaning, but believe, for institutional and 
normative reasons, that it is the best tool for resolving real-world disputes 
                                                                                                                     
 21. With apologies to Heidi Klum. 
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in which the Constitution is invoked. And, of course, one might believe 
that originalism is both a sound interpretative methodology and an 
appropriate decision making tool—albeit for very different reasons. 
Originalists are all too frequently unclear about which species of 
originalism they support and why. It would, therefore, be more than a bit 
unfair to chide Professor Redish for not keeping this distinction clear in his 
discussion. Accordingly, this Article offers the following remarks as 
clarification—not criticism—of Professor Redish’s assessment of 
originalism. 
Professor Redish identifies essentially three sets of problems with 
originalism: practical and conceptual problems with tying meaning to 
history; problems of interpretative uncertainty and the resulting risk of 
manipulation of materials to reach predetermined results; and concerns 
about legitimacy stemming in large measure from the foregoing 
uncertainty-generated risks of manipulation. The severity of these 
problems depends both on what variant of originalism is involved and 
whether one is worried about interpretation (ascertainment of meaning) or 
adjudication (resolution of disputes). 
It is fair to say that Professor Redish is principally concerned about 
originalism-as-adjudication—that is, originalism as a normative 
prescription for how real-world decision makers, such as judges, should 
resolve real-world problems of social governance. This is, for the most 
part, the originalism of Justice Antonin Scalia,
22
 of Professors John 
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport,
23
 of Judge Robert Bork,
24
 and indeed of 
almost everyone (except me) who is involved in the contemporary debates 
about which Professor Redish is commenting. It is very rare to see 
someone try to separate originalism as a tool of interpretation from 
originalism as a tool for making decisions. But from an analytical 
standpoint, it is worthwhile to “break out” the interpretative from the 
adjudicative aspects of originalism, to see what kinds of problems map 
onto each aspect and how those problems might be addressed. 
A.  “Don’t [Need to] Know Much About History”25 
From the standpoint of pure interpretation, with no regard for 
adjudicative consequences, some kind of originalism is clearly the correct 
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) 
(espousing originalism as the preferred means of constitutional judicial decision making). 
 23. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1733–35 (2010) (arguing that the Constitution “should be interpreted according 
to the methods that [its] enactors would have regarded as applicable”). 
 24. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 
143 (1990) (describing the “Original Understanding” in terms of how a judge should apply the 
Constitution). 
 25. With apologies to Same Cooke. See SAM COOKE, Wonderful World, on THE WONDERFUL 
WORLD OF SAM COOKE (Keen Records 1960). 
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way to ascertain the meaning of the United States Constitution—just as it 
is the correct way to ascertain the meaning of the Confederate Constitution, 
the Rhode Island Corporate Charter of 1663, Professor Redish’s latest 
article, and any other communicative instrument. Originalism is, as 
Professor Saikrishna Prakash has so elegantly phrased it, a “Default 
Rule”26 for human communication. If one is not trying to understand the 
original meaning of a communicative instrument, then one simply is not 
engaging in the attempt to ascertain meaning. To be sure, it is possible to 
use the word “interpretation” to describe something other than the 
ascertainment of meaning—such as the invention of meaning or the 
indulgence of fantasies—and as long as those usages are clearly identified 
and employed without equivocation, there is nothing “wrong” with them. It 
is also possible that the original meaning of a particular communicative 
instrument is that the instrument should be understood in terms of 
changing or contemporary meanings—rendering the use of original 
meaning essentially a one-time affair that sets in motion a different 
interpretative enterprise. But in the ordinary run of things, the standard 
usage of “interpretation” connotes ascertainment, and ascertainment 
connotes original meaning. Probably these propositions generate any 
measure of controversy only because, in the context of the United States 
Constitution, ascertainment of meaning is widely thought to have 
prescriptive as well as descriptive consequences, so that most people’s 
views on interpretation are shaped by their views on adjudication. Yet if 
one can get over this analytical conflation and simply treat the meaning of 
the Constitution as an inconsequential anthropological fact to be studied, 
akin to the meaning of the Code of Hammurabi, then original meaning 
must be the starting point. 
Does that mean that originalist interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-
meaning must rely on history, as Professor Redish maintains, along with all 
of the problems (especially for lawyers and law professors) that such 
reliance entails? Yes and no. Yes, because once one has identified a 
document’s time of origin as critical to its meaning, some kind of history 
will necessarily come into play. No, because not all kinds of history are 
created equal, and some kinds of “history”—including some kinds to 
which historians would not dream of giving that label—can be done by 
lawyers. 
If original meaning is found in the concrete, historical intentions or 
understandings of real people, then the identification of those mental states 
is the central enterprise of interpretation. That is a task for which lawyers 
and legal scholars have no special claim to expertise. It is not even clear 
that historians have any such claim; they are much better qualified to say 
what happened than to say what certain people were thinking. That 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Saikrishna B. Prakash, Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
529, 541 (1998). 
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ultimate inquiry into mental states probably requires some deft 
combination of expertise in subjects such as history, psychology, 
linguistics, semiotics, and perhaps law, if the thoughts that people were 
expressing involved technical legal concepts—not to mention other 
specialized disciplines such as economics or religious studies, if those 
disciplines also shaped the actors’ thinking. If that is really what originalist 
interpretation of the Constitution requires, then Professor Redish has 
probably understated the practical problems involved in discerning that 
kind of “meaning.” And this is without even considering the enormous 
conceptual and practical problems raised by trying to distill the intentions 
or understandings of a large group of people who do not share a single 
collective consciousness into the unitary “meaning” of a document. 
These problems are only magnified by moving from “original 
intentions” to “original understandings,” if the “understandings” that 
define meaning are the real understandings of real people. Moving from 
Framers, to ratifiers, to members of the public makes discerning “meaning” 
progressively more difficult, if “meaning” is located in the actual 
thoughts—that is, actual understandings—of the relevant subjects, because 
it multiplies the actual thoughts that must be discerned and somehow 
distilled. But what other kinds of understandings could possibly constitute 
meaning besides the actual understandings of actual people? 
The obvious answer is: fictitious understandings. One could, in 
principle, construct a theory of meaning entirely around a legal fiction. One 
simply needs to invent a single hypothetical “person” who serves as the 
locus of original meaning and to “discern” the intentions or understandings 
of that imaginary “person.” This kind of methodology neatly solves the 
problems involved in trying to draw meaning out of collective or multiple 
intentions or understandings, because there is only one fictitious entity with 
which to be concerned. It also solves, or at least mitigates, the problems of 
reliance upon history if—and this is the big if—the process of “discerning” 
the meaning of this hypothetical person is something other than a purely 
historical undertaking. 
In prior work, Professor Guy Seidman and I have tried to explain why 
this methodology that focuses on legally constructed fictitious intentions is 
sound interpretative theory rather than psychosis.
27
 Although I cannot 
repeat the entire argument here, it is sufficient (I hope) for present purposes 
to emphasize several points: (1) the Constitution itself prescribes this kind 
of interpretative methodology by declaring itself to have been legally 
authored (“ordain[ed] and establish[ed]”)28 by the fictitious entity “We the 
People”;29 (2) all real-world documents that are collectively authored in 
fact must be interpreted as though they were constructed by a single author 
                                                                                                                     
 27. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 12, at 56–57. 
 28. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 29. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 12,  at 58–61. 
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who is an idealized composite of the historically real authors, as only 
individual minds can have intentions;
30
 and (3) the circumstances that led 
to the Constitution’s general acceptance as authoritative—namely, that 
most of the people with guns in 1788 chose not to shoot them at the new 
government’s officials—effectively foreclose any method of interpretation 
that relies on real, rather than fictitious, understandings because the 
number and range of relevant minds simply gets too large.
31
 
Something like this view of originalism has been steadily gaining 
momentum in recent years, even if all of its features are not always 
acknowledged by all of its proponents. In essence, it locates meaning in the 
fictitious mind of the reasonable person of 1788. The “beliefs” of this 
reasonable person do not necessarily correspond to the beliefs of any actual 
person. Instead, the reasonable person is a construct—and a construct put 
together by lawyers. Why lawyers? Because the Constitution is a legal 
document. If the Constitution were a novel (chain or otherwise), 
presumably the reasonable person who determined its meaning would be 
put together by literary theorists (or perhaps by lawyers masquerading as 
literary theorists). But the Constitution is rather obviously not a novel; it is 
a blueprint for assembling and operating a particular form of government. 
Of course, because we are talking about a reasonable person at a particular 
moment in history—in this case, 1788—the need for some knowledge of 
and reliance upon history (and any number of other disciplines) cannot be 
avoided in assembling this imaginary person. Constructing a reasonable 
person from more than two centuries ago is not a casual undertaking. 
However, just as lawyers are, all else being equal, likely better situated 
than, for example, semioticians to construct the reasonable person of tort 
law, they are likely better situated than nonlawyers, including historians (or 
historians masquerading as legal scholars) to construct the reasonable 
person of constitutional interpretation. At the very least, the lack of a Ph.D. 
in history is not disqualifying for the task of constitutional interpretation 
when the source of meaning is a legally constructed fiction. Again, to quote 
Professor Prakash, “history department law”32 is a much greater threat to 
sound constitutional interpretation than is “law office history.” 
It is, of course, possible for lawyers to do a bad job of legally 
constructing the reasonable person of 1788, just as it is possible for anyone 
to do a bad job of anything. Professor Redish is right on the money to 
chastise originalists for not setting forth their necessary methodological 
premises with sufficient care
33—and that is true both of originalists who 
ground meaning in actual history and originalists who ground meaning in 
hypothetical thoughts. If one is making a claim about what a reasonable 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See id. at 61–67. 
 31. See id. at 68–70. 
 32. Prakash, supra note 25, at 534. 
 33. See Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1502. 
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person of 1788 would have thought about something, one must have 
criteria for determining whether such a claim is well or poorly supported. 
One needs something like a “Restatement of the Law of Originalism” or 
the “Federal Rules of Originalism,” which presently does not exist.34 But it 
could exist. In principle, it is possible for lawyers—inexpert, generalist, but 
sophisticated lawyers—to construct an originalist methodology that does 
not fall prey to the conceptual problems of joint understandings or pose 
insuperable problems of historiography. And, increasingly, perhaps even 
without realizing the full implications, sophisticated originalists are 
moving toward that understanding of originalism. Those who do not move 
in that direction certainly have some splainin’ to do, and I leave them to 
fend for themselves against Professor Redish’s potent critique. 
It is quite possible to have an originalist theory of interpretation that is 
neither archeologically nor conceptually foreclosed by the nature of 
interpretation—and that indeed is compelled by the very nature of 
interpretation-as-ascertainment-of-meaning. Reasonable-person originalism, 
as one might call it, is not simply one among many possible means of 
interpreting the Constitution. It is uniquely the correct means of 
interpreting the Constitution, if by “interpreting” we mean “ascertaining 
the meaning.” 
But if originalism is not tethered to hard historical facts, and instead 
roams inside the fictitious head of a legally constructed reasonable person, 
how can originalism “succeed in its most fundamental pursuit: avoidance 
of uncertainty and ideologically driven outcome determination”?35 Once 
originalism is understood to be founded upon a legal fiction constructed by 
lawyers—rather than upon actual historical facts contained in available 
documentary materials—does not originalism’s veneer of constraint and 
objectivity vanish away? 
I certainly hope so. Anyone who tries to structure an interpretative 
inquiry to generate only answers that are constraining or rule-like 
fundamentally misunderstands the enterprise of interpretation. The goal of 
interpretation is to find correct answers, however freeing or un-rule-like 
they may turn out to be. If the Constitution contained an Article VIII that 
said, “Anything else in this document to the contrary notwithstanding, 
judges get to make up at random wildly subjective standards, to be applied 
in cases at the uncontrollable whims of judges,” a good originalist would 
have to interpret the document as prescribing exactly what it says, however 
open-ended, freeing, and un-rule-like the instruction seems (or is). No good 
interpretative originalist should prejudge the content of the Constitution 
before undertaking the enterprise of interpretation. One finds whatever one 
                                                                                                                     
 34. For my and Professor Guy Seidman’s preliminary thoughts on how to construct the 
reasonable person of 1788 for purposes of constitutional interpretation, see Lawson & Seidman, 
supra note 12, at 70–73. 
 35. Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1501. 
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finds.
36
 
Nor should a good originalist prejudge how likely one is to find 
anything at all. For example, if a historian is searching for an answer to 
why Napoleon Bonaparte chose a particular moment in time to sell the 
Louisiana Territory, it is possible that the historian will find an answer that 
satisfies the historian’s professional norms. But presumably, if the 
historian is a good historian, he will be open to the possibility that the 
inquiry will end indeterminately. He might conclude, at the end of the 
inquiry, that he simply cannot determine the answer from the available 
materials and might as well move on to the next question. Similarly, an 
originalist interpreter must be open to the possibility that, after examining a 
particular question, the “correct” originalist answer will be something to 
the effect of “beats me.” Especially when dealing with the hypothetical 
thoughts of a legally constructed fiction, a bit of humility in the 
interpretative enterprise seems appropriate. How often originalism will fail 
to yield a determinate interpretative answer is impossible to say without (1) 
specifying a complete theory of interpretation; (2) identifying the standard 
of proof for interpretative claims within the theory (“I don’t know” will be 
the “correct” answer far more often if the standard of proof for 
interpretative claims is “beyond a reasonable doubt” than if the standard is 
“best available alternative”)37; and (3) applying the fully specified theory to 
a sufficient number of representative problems to allow useful 
generalizations about the theory’s interpretative determinacy. The same is 
true of any other interpretative theory: Claims about determinacy, without 
specification of all of the above, are worth about as much as a current law 
student’s Social Security account. 
Professor Redish is right, however, to recognize a uniquely strong 
commitment to constraint in much of contemporary originalism. He does 
not exaggerate when he writes that this version of originalism—what might 
be called “mainstream” originalism—zealously tries to ground 
interpretation in some kind of objective inquiry (whether historical or not) 
that will “preserve the democratic system, promote judicial restraint and 
consistency of precedent, and produce ‘good’ results.”38 A good deal of 
originalism undeniably presents itself to the world as an, or even the, 
interpretative theory that can significantly constrain results. As indicated 
above, any such effort is profoundly mistaken, both factually and 
aspirationally. Interpretative theory should aim for correct interpretations, 
not institutional or political goals. 
                                                                                                                     
 36. For an example of a prominent originalist getting this right (and contrasting the position 
with that of another prominent originalist getting it wrong), see Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, 
Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 673–75 (2009). 
 37. See generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992) (discussing 
the role of standards of proof in the proper assessment of interpretative claims). 
 38. Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1494 (footnotes omitted). 
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But then what should judges do in constitutional cases? Should they be 
trying to construct the hypothetical thoughts of the reasonable person of 
1788, whatever that entails? Yes, they should, if—and again, this is a very 
large if—they want to decide cases in accordance with the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution. While that may seem like a trivial 
condition, in fact it is anything but. Most constitutional theorists—and that 
includes most originalists as well as Professor Redish—do not view the 
endeavor of correctly interpreting the Constitution as the exclusive, or even 
primary, goal of constitutional adjudication. If they did, they would have 
nothing but an epistemological view of precedent (in which precedents 
would count only as evidence of the right answer). They would not worry 
about judicial restraint or democratic legitimacy, and they would not care 
about reliance interests or institutional consequences. As it happens, 
everybody (well, everybody except me) cares quite deeply about these 
other, non-interpretative matters,
39
 which just illustrates the obvious, but 
oft-neglected, point that interpretative theory and adjudicative theory are 
two different intellectual enterprises. It is one thing to say that X is the right 
way to interpret the Constitution and another thing altogether to say that X 
is the right way to apply the Constitution. The former statement is a 
proposition in the domain of interpretative theory, while the latter is a 
proposition in the domain of moral or political theory, as it prescribes a 
normative course of action for real-world actors threatening the real-world 
exercise of the government’s coercive power. The latter might or might not 
consider the former relevant, but the former has no regard for the latter. For 
people who are interested only in interpretative theory, this Article is 
therefore pretty much at an end. 
However, for the vast majority who are interested in adjudicative 
theory, the nagging question remains whether reasonable-person 
originalism, without a strict reliance on historical materials, can produce an 
even remotely plausible adjudicative theory. While I am not prepared to 
enter the thicket of normative theory by purporting to tell judges what to do 
with people’s lives, liberty, and property,40 there appears to be an 
overlapping consensus that adjudication should employ methods that yield 
answers at least most of the time. An adjudicative theory that cannot 
resolve disputes indeed seems like a very silly adjudicative theory, 
particularly since the whole purpose of adjudication is to resolve 
                                                                                                                     
 39. See Lawson, supra note 15, at 1227–28 (identifying seven tasks other than ascertainment 
of meaning that Professor Jack Balkin proposes for interpretative theory in JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011)). 
 40. To be precise, I am not prepared to tell them what to do in a work of professional 
scholarship. Outside of scholarship, where there is no pretense of professionalism, I will be happy 
to tell them, and the rest of their fellow governmental lackeys, to keep their grubby mitts off of my 
money and their statist laws out of my life. But not here. 
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disputes.
41
 If translating originalism-as-interpretation into originalism-as-
adjudication yields a theory of decision making that requires decision 
makers to say “beats me” much of the time, is that a workable theory of 
adjudication? Does that describe reasonable-person originalism? 
Adjudicating minds want to know. 
B.  “In My Head are Many Facts of Which I Wish I Was More Certain I 
Was Sure”42 
As indicated above,
43
 I am in no position to make strong claims about 
the degree of interpretative determinacy of reasonable-person originalism, 
either absolutely or comparatively. For one thing, it requires a full 
specification of the theory’s principles of admissibility and significance. 
For another, it requires specification of a standard of proof for 
interpretative claims; the extent of interpretative indeterminacy will vary, 
perhaps wildly, with changes in the standard of proof. And for another, it 
requires a large empirical sample of efforts at interpretation to see how 
many inquiries turn up indeterminate. 
I will, however, make the very strong claim that an adjudicative theory 
that relies upon reasonable-person originalism yields a completely 
determinate set of adjudicative outcomes. A judge applying reasonable-
person originalism will always be able to decide the case for one or another 
party in a principled and determinate fashion. 
The key is to recognize that interpretative indeterminacy and 
adjudicative indeterminacy are very different concepts. They are connected 
only if one has a theory of adjudication that requires a correct interpretative 
answer to every problem; however, there is nothing in the enterprise of 
adjudication that entails any such requirement. 
Consider how a legal system deals with factual uncertainty. There will 
often be great difficulty determining what happened in any particular 
dispute. Evidence is often ambiguous or unavailable. Testimony is often 
conflicting or unreliable, and reconstructing even relatively recent past 
events poses grave epistemological problems. Much of the time, the honest 
answer to factual questions under any particular standard of proof, other 
than a never-employed “best available alternative” standard,44 is likely to 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Or, at least, so says one very prominent view of adjudication. It is also possible to see 
adjudication as serving other goals, such as declaring public values or allowing people to tell 
stories. See Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1191, 1218–34 (2011) 
(describing different models of adjudication and their implications). I will hesitantly venture into a 
bit of normative territory by suggesting that if one wants a forum for declaring values or telling 
stories, blogging is probably a more appropriate venue than litigation, because blogging does not 
put other people’s lives, fortunes, and sacred honors in the dock. 
 42. With apologies to Rodgers and Hammerstein. See RICHARD RODGERS & OSCAR 
HAMMERSTEIN II, A Puzzlement, in THE FIRST PART OF THE KING AND I act 1, sc. 3. 
 43. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 44. While some scholars have proposed something like a “best available alternative” standard 
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be, “I don’t know.” If fact finders always had to reach definitive 
conclusions about what happened, the legal system would be in real 
trouble. 
Fortunately, fact finders can decide cases without actually reaching 
conclusions about what happened. That is because the law always assigns a 
burden of proof to one or the other party. If there is genuine uncertainty 
about what happened, the party that bears the burden of proof loses. 
Indeed, the epistemological function of a burden of proof is to allocate the 
risk of uncertainty to the party that bears the burden. A party with the 
burden of proof loses either if the fact finder affirmatively decides that the 
party’s account of the facts is wrong or if the fact finder fails affirmatively 
to decide that the party’s account of the facts is correct. An agnostic fact 
finder rules against the party with the burden of proof. As long as a burden 
of proof is always specified, epistemological uncertainty can still yield 
complete adjudicative determinacy. 
The same is true of constitutional adjudication. As long as it is possible 
to specify a burden of proof for claims about constitutional meaning, it is 
simply irrelevant for the determinacy of adjudication just how 
indeterminate the underlying theory of interpretation proves to be. A highly 
indeterminate interpretative theory—and again, the degree of 
indeterminacy is highly dependent on the standard of proof—just means 
that parties with burdens of proof will lose a lot of cases. 
I have argued elsewhere
45
 that originalism prescribes a complete and 
specific—and, under a wide range of standards of proof, interpretatively 
determinate—allocation of burdens of proof for constitutional 
adjudication. “He who asserts must prove” is a basic principle of 
epistemology, and therefore of rational thinking. As long as the 
Constitution contemplates rational thinking by those who administer it 
(and the evidence for that contemplation is overwhelming), the ordinary 
allocation of burdens of proof for claims of constitutional meaning must 
rest with the party that asserts the Constitution as part of its claim. In 
practice, this means that advocates of federal power will almost always 
bear the burden of proof while opponents of state power will (I think I can 
safely say) always bear the burden of proof. The federal government draws 
all of its power from the Constitution, so any action of any federal actor 
must be justified by reference to some affirmative grant of power in the 
Constitution. The initial burden of justifying federal action thus always lies 
with the party relying on the legal validity of such action for its claim. To 
                                                                                                                     
for factual questions, see Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. REV. 
401, 425–437 (1986), the Anglo-American legal system normally imposes at least a “more likely 
than not” standard for fact finding. The higher the standard of proof, the more opportunities are 
created for epistemological uncertainty. 
 45. See Gary Lawson, Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
411, 423–28 (1996); Lawson, supra note 15, at 1233–35. 
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be sure, there are instances where that initial burden seems to be met, but is 
countered by a claim from the other side that a grant of power to a federal 
actor is qualified or limited or negated by some other provision, such as a 
“thou shalt not.” In that instance, the burden of proving the “thou shalt not” 
shifts to the party asserting it; in that context, the opponent of federal 
power will bear the burden of proof, and will therefore assume the 
adjudicative risk of interpretative uncertainty. Similarly, because state 
governments do not draw their legal power from the Federal Constitution, 
a proponent of state authority never bears an initial burden of proof. 
Rather, an opponent of state power who is invoking a “thou shalt not” 
contained in the Federal Constitution has the burden of proof. 
Epistemological uncertainty (again as defined by the relevant standard of 
proof) means adjudicative defeat for whoever holds that burden. 
The nature of the Constitution as a grant of certain powers to the 
federal government and a denial of certain powers to state governments 
establishes the appropriate burdens of proof for interpretative uncertainty. 
In essence, the Constitution establishes a presumption against federal 
power in favor of state power, which can only be overcome by sufficient 
interpretative evidence to the contrary, depending on the relevant standard 
of proof. Otherwise, the presumptions—which are interpretatively derived 
and not simply normative inventions
46—decide the case. Importantly, those 
presumptions are not easily manipulated. There is not much room for 
argument about whether a claim depends upon an affirmative assertion of 
federal power, of state power, or of a limitation on federal power for which 
a prima facie case has already been established. Ironically, the more that 
adjudicative results depend upon these burdens of proof and presumptions, 
the more principled and non-manipulable the adjudicative process 
becomes. 
Of course, this kind of presumption-driven decision making does not 
appear to be what many, or even most, originalists mean when they talk 
about the determinacy of originalist adjudication. In all likelihood, what 
they have in mind is reaching interpretatively determinate conclusions, 
akin to having fact finders decisively conclude what really happened. But, 
at the risk of appearing immodest, I think they have such things in mind 
simply because they have not thought through basic questions of 
interpretation and adjudication very carefully. It may well be that 
reasonable-person originalism, or any other interpretative theory, can in 
fact provide determinate interpretative conclusions in a large percentage of 
                                                                                                                     
 46. In this respect, the Constitution’s presumptions are quite different from something like 
Professor Randy Barnett’s presumption of liberty, see generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING 
THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004), which Professor Barnett applies to 
assertions of both state and federal power. In essence, the actual Constitution prescribes one 
presumption of liberty (for assertions of federal power) and another presumption of tyranny (for 
assertions of state power). 
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the relevant cases. Indeed, if the standard of proof for interpretative claims 
is something like a “best available alternative” standard, interpretative 
determinacy is all but guaranteed in most instances. The point here is only 
that the adjudicative determinacy of originalism does not depend on any 
such result. 
Accordingly, what emerges from Professor Redish’s critique of 
originalism, and from my reconstruction of originalism in light of that 
critique (much of which I echo), is something that may well be 
unrecognizable to, and unwelcomed by, many self-described originalists. 
Sound originalist interpretation consists of discerning the legally 
constructed hypothetical thoughts of the reasonable person of 1788, 
embodied in the fictitious “We the People” whom the Constitution claims 
as its legal author. Originalist adjudication may well involve a healthy dose 
of decision-by-presumption, depending upon the standard of proof for 
interpretative claims and the ability of the underlying interpretative theory 
to meet that standard in important cases. This model of originalist 
interpretation fares reasonably well under Professor Redish’s history-based 
interpretative critique, and this model of originalist adjudication survives 
relatively undamaged by Professor Redish’s determinacy-and-
manipulation-based critique. It may not be what Justice Scalia does and 
what Judge Bork would like to do, but it is the correct way to interpret the 
Constitution. 
But what of democratic legitimacy? It is one thing to be governed by 
the real thoughts of real people who one believes were either authorized to 
set legal rules or were wise enough in the ways of human affairs to trust 
with one’s life, liberty, and property. It is quite another to be governed by a 
legal fiction filtered through adjudicative presumptions. How could 
originalism, as this Article has constructed it, possibly lay claim to any 
kind of normative legitimacy, democratic or otherwise? 
How indeed? 
C.  “You Don’t Care if it’s Wrong or if it’s Right”47 
“Concerns about legitimacy underwrite theories of constitutional 
interpretation . . . [and] we argue for or against different theories of 
constitutional interpretation in terms of their effects on legitimacy.”48 
When Professor Jack Balkin wrote those words, he spoke for almost 
everyone involved in debates over constitutional theory. Those debates are, 
and have long been, dominated by concerns about the legitimacy of various 
constitutional theories and of the roles for federal judges prescribed by 
those theories. Constitutional theory is as much, if not more, about the 
institutional role of the federal judiciary as it is about the ascertainment of 
                                                                                                                     
 47. With apologies to The Police. See THE POLICE, Roxanne, on OUTLANDOS D’AMOUR 
(1978). 
 48. BALKIN, supra note 38, at 64. 
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constitutional meaning. Indeed, many theories of interpretation—including 
many versions of originalism—are driven by concerns about institutional 
decision making rather than by interpretative theory.
49
 These concerns 
obviously animate much of Professor Redish’s analysis—as they have 
animated much of his work over a long and distinguished career. 
I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose to 
say nothing about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral concept, and I 
am not a political or moral theorist. As I am fond of saying, I am barely a 
lawyer.
50
 To be sure, political legitimacy is an important thing about which 
to think.
51
 It just is not the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not 
to venture outside that relatively narrow zone of comfort in professional 
academic work.
52
 
Accordingly, I make no claim that judges, or anyone else, ought, as a 
matter of political morality, to decide real-world cases in accordance with 
originalism (or any other theory of interpretation). I say only that 
reasonable-person originalism is uniquely the correct way to ascertain the 
meaning of the Constitution, that such a methodology interpretatively 
prescribes an allocation of burdens of proof for claims about constitutional 
powers and limitations, and that an adjudicative theory founded upon such 
a methodology would be determinate and relatively hard to manipulate. 
Further the deponent saith not.
53
 
                                                                                                                     
 49. See Gary Lawson, Conservative or Constitutionalist?, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 82 
(2002) (stating that the essence of much of modern originalism’s philosophy rests on a theory of 
judging rather than interpretative theory). 
 50. J.D., 1983, Yale Law[?] School. 
 51. Indeed, in my nonprofessional life, I am very concerned about political legitimacy—
especially since, as a libertarian anarchist, I do not find much of it anywhere. I certainly do not find 
it in democracy. If two people come upon a third in an alley and vote to take the third person’s 
wallet, there is nothing legitimate about the action (unless, of course, they have a valid claim to the 
wallet based on something other than their vote, such as a prior theft of the wallet by the third 
person). If one multiplies the numbers on each side by 100,000,000 and changes the alley to a series 
of polling booths, all one has changed is the number of victims and the number of perpetrators. 
Democracy is a fine way for a group to decide where to have dinner or who will chair the next 
faculty meeting. It is not a fine way to decide who gets to spend my money or which substances I 
can ingest. 
 52. Since anyone can find it by a simple web search, here is the one very modest exception to 
that rule (along with the special reasons for that very modest exception). See generally Gary 
Lawson, Truth, Justice, and the Libertarian Way(s), 91 B.U. L. REV. 1347 (2011). 
 53. Does that mean that I have no opinion about whether the original meaning of the 
Constitution should be considered authoritative by judges? Of course I have an opinion about that. 
It simply is not an opinion that I think can be defended with the kind of analytical rigor that is 
appropriate to an academic endeavor. I should be clear that in saying this, I am not purporting to 
judge others who choose to opine more freely. My silence on these matters results from a personal 
preference, not from a grand theory about appropriate academic behavior. 
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II.  WHY IS THIS THEORY DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER THEORIES?
54
 
Professor Redish is searching for the “appropriate method of 
adjudication for our system of constitutional democracy.”55 His primary 
focus is adjudication, not interpretation. His account of interpretation—
which is to follow a contemporary plain-language understanding of the 
constitutional text and supplement it with explicitly identified normative 
premises where necessary—is entirely driven by the demands of his 
“controlled activism” model of adjudication rather than by, for example, 
philosophical theories of meaning or language. Accordingly, because 
adjudicative theory is inherently normative (a prescription of what decision 
makers ought to do), any assessment of Professor Redish’s “controlled 
activism” model must also be normative. For reasons previously stated, I 
will therefore neither praise nor bury the model. Instead, I have some 
questions—four questions, of course—concerning its foundation and 
mechanics that might help others, including Professor Redish, evaluate, 
modify, and apply the model. 
First, I have an empirical question that may not have an accessible 
answer. Professor Redish is preoccupied with the ideas of candor and 
consistency, which he often labels as principle. He does not object to 
having judges draw on their own moral judgments in adjudication, but he 
does object to their doing so under a false veneer of objectivity or with 
partisan inconsistency. His enemies are deceit and manipulation, not (as 
with me) interpretative error or (as with mainstream originalism) lack of 
fidelity to external standards. Accordingly, his theory is structured to 
minimize those vices by encouraging judges to be open about their 
normative premises and to formulate those premises into doctrine at a 
sufficient level of generality to prevent their nakedly partisan application. 
But, of course, judges can lie (or honestly mislead themselves) about their 
actual premises and dress up normative premises that they think would be 
looked upon unkindly in other terms, and they can always misapply 
doctrine or fudge the level of generality of the underlying norms 
sufficiently to make partisan application hard to detect. Professor Redish 
does not claim otherwise; his argument is that any such dangers are less 
than they are with originalism (or the various nontextual theories that he 
critiques). But his argument to this effect is purely anecdotal. He identifies 
some instances of what he regards (perhaps correctly) as false originalist 
claims to objectivity and generalizes to inherent problems with the entire 
theory. The empirical question is: exactly how susceptible to manipulation 
is the kind of originalism most commonly practiced by courts and scholars 
(which is not the kind of originalism that I would advocate, but forget me 
for a moment)? It seems to me that one would need to run the mainstream 
                                                                                                                     
 54. With apologies to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 
 55. Redish & Arnould, supra note 1, at 1522. 
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originalist theory through not just a few leading cases and a few comments 
by pompous historians and economists, but a large enough sample of cases 
to make reliable judgments about susceptibility to the kinds of abuse to 
which Professor Redish objects. Are there no originalist success stories? 
Every instance of originalist application involves hidden motives and 
partisan subterfuges? For the kinds of strong claims that Professor Redish 
is making, one probably should have much better data about the actual rate 
at which originalism falls prey to the various pathologies to which 
Professor Redish finds it susceptible. The fact (and it is a fact) that it might 
fall prey to those pathologies, and that on some occasions it in fact does, 
does not provide enough information to make good judgments about the 
overall extent to which it falls prey to those pathologies. A second aspect 
of that empirical question concerns the susceptibility to abuse of Professor 
Redish’s controlled activism alternative. Let us concede that Professor 
Redish’s model, perfectly and faithfully applied, is superior along the 
dimensions of candor and neutrality to mainstream originalism applied 
faithlessly and in partisan fashion. But that is not a meaningful 
comparison. The meaningful comparisons are either faithful and neutral 
application versus faithful and neutral application, or dishonest and 
partisan application versus dishonest and partisan application. Perhaps 
there are empirical reasons to think that there will be less dishonest and 
partisan application under controlled activism than under mainstream 
originalism, but those reasons have yet to be produced. 
Second, and more fundamentally, Professor Redish never explains why 
the contemporary plain language of the Constitution serves as the baseline 
limit on judicial review. To be sure, he has a theory of adjudication that 
requires some external constraint on judges, so that judicial review is not 
simply naked political preferences, but there are many candidates for such 
a restraining influence other than the contemporary meaning of the 
Constitution’s words. One could just as readily choose the contemporary 
meaning of the words of the Constitution of Massachusetts, the United 
Nations Charter, or the Libertarian Party Platform of 1980. Why the 
contemporary meaning of the words of the Constitution? 
One possible answer is that those words were “subjected to the 
ratification process.”56 But all of the other words that I suggested as 
alternatives were also subjected to some kind of ratification process by 
different groups of people. What is it about the ratification process (or, 
more precisely, the multiple ratification processes for various provisions 
and amendments across two centuries) of the Constitution’s words that 
gives those words such a special role as vehicles for constraint? 
Particularly if the meanings of those words are determined by modern 
understandings—rather than by any understandings that actually, or even 
                                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 1528. 
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hypothetically, existed during the actual ratification processes—it is hard 
to see why one would privilege those words in any fashion. To be clear, I 
am not arguing in favor of linguistic chaos and epistemological arrogance. 
I fully understand Professor Redish’s desire to have some kind of textual 
check on judges. I am just wondering why that textual check needs to be 
the contemporary meanings of the words of the Constitution, rather than 
the contemporary meanings of some other text. 
Third, on a more modest mechanical level, Professor Redish states that 
when considering the plain meaning of a provision, it is permissible (and 
perhaps even mandatory) to “take into account the words that appear 
around the words in question.”57 But what counts as the words “around” a 
provision? Do all of the words in the entire Constitution count as part of 
the linguistic context in which any particular provision must be 
understood? A simple example will illustrate the importance of 
determining the sheer physical scope of surrounding context. The 
Territories and Property Clause in Article IV provides that Congress has 
power “to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations 
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”58 
Since money in the federal treasury is “Property belonging to the United 
States,” a straight linguistic analysis could read this provision as a 
“spending clause” allowing Congress to “dispose of” that “Property” as it 
pleases. The clause contains no internal limitations on the purposes or 
forms of that spending, so the “plain meaning” approach would appear to 
yield an unlimited federal spending power. If, however, one looks back to 
Article I, one will find all of the other fiscal powers and responsibilities of 
the federal government loaded into that Article, including the powers to tax 
and borrow and limitations on the forms of appropriations. One will also 
find in Article I a clause authorizing Congress to “make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers,”59 and spending laws certainly seem to qualify as such “Laws.” 
Since the location of every fiscal power other than the spending power is in 
Article I, it probably makes sense to read the reference to “Property” in 
Article IV as meaning something like “Property similar in nature to 
Territory, which is the primary object of this clause.” Thus, it likewise 
would make sense to locate the federal spending power in the Article I 
Necessary and Proper Clause, along with whatever limitations are 
contained within that clause, rather than in the Article IV Territories and 
Property Clause.
60
 But the proper interpretation depends on how far (quite 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 1529. 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
 59. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 60. There is no remotely plausible textual case for reading the Article I Taxing Clause as a 
spending clause—which means that there is yet another feature of modern law, in addition to those 
identified by Professor Redish, for which there is no remotely plausible textual case. While I am on 
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literally) from the Territories and Property Clause one is willing to look for 
context. 
Fourth, Professor Redish falls back on normative judging because he 
thinks, quite rightly, that his contemporary-meaning textualism will answer 
a relatively small (though certainly far from trivial) number of cases, and 
something must fill in the gap to allow courts to resolve disputes. I would 
be curious to know whether he regards open and candid judicial 
application of normative premises as superior to resolution of disputes 
through allocations of burdens of proof, and, if so, why. As I have shown, 
allocation of burdens of proof can certainly do the job of allowing courts to 
decide cases when constitutional meaning, however it is determined, has 
been exhausted. Is that method less candid and more subject to 
manipulation than controlled judicial activism? Or are there other criteria 
for selecting among methods of dispute resolution that need to be 
identified? 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Redish and I are interested in very different kinds of 
constitutional questions, which in some respects makes me an unfortunate 
choice as a commenter. My interest lies in the ascertainment of 
constitutional meaning, while Professor Redish’s lies primarily in the 
prescription of norms for real-world adjudication. But even for those who 
are interpreters rather than adjudicators, Professor Redish’s analysis forces 
them to confront some very basic questions about the nature of 
interpretation (and even the nature of adjudication) that are frequently 
swept under the rug. Interpreters and adjudicators alike are better for 
having to think about Professor Redish’s work. And making people think 
is, in my judgment, an academic’s highest calling. 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
the topic, let me suggest another textually implausible conclusion for Professor Redish’s list: that 
the President or the federal courts can ever violate the First Amendment. Textually, the First 
Amendment refers only to Congress. Since the Constitution quite specifically defines what counts 
as Congress (of which the President and the courts are not part), plain meaning textualism 
categorically rules out any First Amendment restraints on the President and the federal courts. And 
just to be clear: I am endorsing, not criticizing, this conclusion. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 16–19 (2006). 
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